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Abstract 
  A special safeguard mechanism is an attractive policy tool for low income 
importing countries because it is automatic and does not require an injury test.  Exporters 
might accept a safeguard for low income countries if it results in larger tariff cuts than in 
its absence.  Using wheat as a case study the effects of a special safeguard mechanism on 
market stability and welfare are evaluated.  The results show that a safeguard mechanism 
is not very trade distorting and costs less than 20 percent of the world welfare gain that 
would be realized if developing countries were not granted a safeguard. 
 









   3
Background 
  WTO member countries have a number of legal means to cope with import 
surges.  For “fairly” traded imports they can rely on the provisions of Article XIX of the 
GATT 1994 and the Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards.  For “unfairly” traded 
imports they have recourse to countervailing duties and anti-dumping actions
1.  However, 
each of these trade actions requires the importing country to provide proof of injury and 
in the case of the general safeguard provision to provide compensation
2.  For low income 
countries, proving injury and providing compensation is often beyond their technical and 
financial capabilities.  For this reason, the Special Agricultural Safeguard (SSG) made 
available to Members in the Uruguay Round (UR) of trade negotiations has considerable 
appeal to developing country importers.  First, the SSG was designed to counter import 
surges and sharp declines in import prices.  Second, the rules for its application are 
transparent and it requires no injury test, nor the provision of compensation.  However, 
one of the preconditions for SSG use by Members was the requirement to convert all 
non-tariff barriers to equivalent tariffs during the UR and to include the SSG designation 
in their schedule of commitments
3. Many low income countries are not eligible to use the 
current SSG because they set bound tariffs outside the tariffication process, meaning they 
did not apply non-tariff barriers before the UR.  Of the 148 current members of the WTO 
only 39 countries reserved the right to use the SSG, of which 29 are developing countries.  




  In the WTO agricultural negotiations leading up to the launch of the Doha 
Development Round (DDR) low income countries tabled numerous proposals calling for 
Special and Differential Treatment.  One aspect of Special and Differential Treatment 
mentioned in many of these proposals is the need for a Special Safeguard Mechanism 
(SSM) to help manage import surges and rapid price declines in staple commodities.  The 
special role of low income countries in the DDR was recognized in the Ministerial 
Declaration launching the Round (WTO 2001): 
 
“…developing countries form an integral part of the trade negotiations both in 
terms of countries’ commitments and in terms of food security and rural 
development” 
 
  The need to have developing countries fully “on-side” was further demonstrated 
in Cancún in September 2003; with the failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference to 
agree on the modalities for the negotiations.  This stalemate was not resolved until 1 
August 2004 when the WTO Members agreed on a Work Programme to guide the 
remainder of the negotiations (WTO 2004).  
                                            
1 These actions are governed by the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and the 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994. 
2 Generally, compensation is provided by the importing country lowering its tariffs on other commodities. 
This compensation requirement of Article XIX has become one of the largest deterrents against its use 
especially among low income countries. 
3 See Article 5 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture for further details regarding the SSG. 
4 The three countries are: the United States, the European Union and Japan.   4
  
  A well designed SSM might form an important part of an acceptable agricultural 
package for low income countries.  The need for an SSM is recognized in several 
important WTO documents but the wording changes through time suggest a lack of 
consensus on the exact form a new SSM should take.  The following elements were 
contained in the 12 February 2003 draft text prepared by the Chair of the agricultural 
negotiations, Stuart Harbinson (WTO 2003a): 
 
•  The current SSG would cease to apply for developed countries. 
•  Developing countries could continue to use the current SSG for products 
identified in their UR tariff schedules. 
 
•  Developing countries could apply the current SSG to new strategic products 
designated with an SSM in their tariff schedules. 
 
•  There would be a review of Article 5 (the article describing the SSG) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture to ensure it meets the needs of developing countries. 
 
  On 18 March 2003 Mr. Harbinson tabled a revised draft text (WTO 2003b).  In 
this text the wording surrounding a new special safeguard measure was changed.  The 
new wording maintains bullets one and two above, but replaces bullets three and four 
with the following wording: 
 
•  Developing countries may not apply the current SSG and a new SSM to a 
product, concurrently. 
 
•  Technical work will be undertaken on the development of an SSM. 
  In the 13 September 2003 Draft Cancún Ministerial Text tabled by Mexican 
Foreign Minister Lois Ernesto Derbez the wording was refined to: “A special agricultural 
safeguard shall be established for use by developing countries subject to conditions for 
products to be determined” (WTO 2003c).   In the 1 August 2004 Work Programme the 
wording is changed to “A special safeguard mechanism will be established for use by 
developing country members” (WTO 2004).  
 
  This commitment to an SSM, but the lack of detail on the exact parameters 
suggests there is scope for research to shed light on this issue
5.  Basically, an SSM is a 
temporary tariff and the economics of tariffs are well known.  Exporters favor the 
elimination of tariffs and importers lower them with great reluctance, in spite of the fact 
that there are often welfare gains in importing countries as a result of tariff elimination.  
The attraction of an SSM, to an exporter, stems from the realization that the existence of 
an SSM might entice a low income importer to lower its tariffs more than in the absence 
                                            
5 Very little analysis of special safeguard mechanisms is available in the literature.  Somwaru and Skully 
have examined a special agricultural safeguard but using a methodology quite different from what is 
employed in this study. Ruffer and Vergano provide a good discussion of the rationale for an SSM.   5
of an SSM.  The use of an SSM is discretionary; an importer has the right but not the 
obligation to use the measure when it is triggered.  Hence, from the exporter’s 
perspective it might be better to face higher tariffs part of the time, than high tariffs all of 
the time.  This is clearly an empirical question that hinges on the size of the tariff cuts, 
the size of the additional tariff an importer can impose when the SSM is triggered, how 
often the SSM is triggered, and on how often the importing country will actually use the 
SSM when it is triggered.  It is on these questions that this study is focused. 
 
Objectives 
  Since the economic effects of an SSM are largely an empirical issue a case study 
approach is adopted.  Wheat is chosen for analysis for a number of reasons: 1) it is a 
staple commodity; 2) it is of export interest to a number of developed countries; and 3) it 
is a major importable of low income countries.  The focus of this study is on three 
questions: 1) will an SSM stabilize commodity markets in low income countries; 2) does 
an SSM have the potential to entice low income countries to accept larger tariff cuts; and 
3) how costly would an SSM be for wheat exporters, who consist primarily of developed 
countries. 
 
The Special Safeguard Mechanism 
  None of the proposals tabled during the WTO negotiations contain explicit 
parameters for an SSM but many of the proposals make reference to the current SSG.  
For that reason it is assumed that the parameters of a new SSM will mirror those of the 
current SSG.  Consequently, the SSM will consist of a “price safeguard” and a “volume 
safeguard”.  A country can apply the price safeguard whenever its import price falls to 
less than 90 percent of the average price in the previous three years
6.  The price safeguard 
applies on a per shipment basis which creates a number of modeling difficulties that are 
discussed in the next section.  The remedy under the price safeguard is an additional duty, 
where the additional duty increases the further the import price falls below the reference 
price (Figure 1).  For example, if the import price falls 30 percent below the reference 
price the additional duty is six percent but if it falls 60 percent then the additional duty is 
19 percent.   
 
  The calculation of the volume safeguard is more complex and is not illustrated 
here, but an understanding of its objective is important
7. In general, the larger the share of 
imports in domestic consumption, the smaller the import surge required to trigger the 
volume SSM.  The volume safeguard remedy is an additional tariff equal to one-third of 
the country’s applied tariff.  Note that member countries may not apply the volume based 
SSM and the price based SSM concurrently.  Furthermore, no country is required to 
apply the additional tariffs allowed by an SSM.  However, in this analysis it is assumed 
that a country will always apply a safeguard when it has the right to do so, and further if 
                                            
6 The Uruguay Round SSG used average prices over the 1986-88 period to form the price trigger level and 
in this study the reference period is updated to 1999-2001. 
7 For details concerning the calculation of the volume safeguard see Article 5 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture.   6
it has the choice of applying either the price or volume safeguard it will choose the one 
allowing the highest additional duty. 
 
The Model and Data 
  The model is a static, synthetic, stochastic, partial equilibrium model of the wheat 
sector calibrated to supply and demand data averaged over 1999-2001
8.  Thirty-eight 
countries/regions are included in the model.  Of these, 32 are net importers.  The 
equations used to represent a typical wheat importing country (i) are shown below.   
Domestic price linkage equations for the net exporting countries are the same as equation 
(1) except there is no price adjustment for tariffs and there are modifications made to 
handle a few domestic policies as discussed in the next section.   
 
PDi= PWH*(EXCHi + ε1t)*(1+APPTi)                     (1) 
QWHi = α0 + β0 PDi + ε2t        ( 2 )  
DFOWHi = α1 – β1 PDi + ε3t        ( 3 )  
DFEWHi = α2 – β2 PDi         ( 4 )  
NTWHi = QWHi –DFEWHi - DFOWHi– (ESTWHi – BSTWHi)  (5) 
∑NTWHi =  0  i=  1…38        (6) 
  Ignoring for the moment the random error terms, equation (1) relates the domestic 
wheat price (PD) to the world wheat price (PWH), converted to local currency (EXCH) 
and adjusted for the appropriate applied ad valorem tariff (APPT)
9.   Equation (2) 
determines the local wheat supply (QWH) as a function of the local price and equations 
(3) and (4) determine local food (DFOWH) and feed (DFEWH) wheat demand 
respectively.  Equation (5) calculates the net trade position (defined as net exports) of 
each country with beginning (BSTWH) and ending (ESTWH) stocks held fixed. Finally, 
equation (6) is the market clearing condition that determines the world price by forcing 
the sum of net trade, across all of the countries, to zero.  The parameters in the model are 
largely derived from elasticities in the OECD’s AGLINK model
10.  
   
                                            
8 In the theoretical and empirical analysis it is assumed that producers and consumers are risk neutral. 
9 In equation (1) it is assumed that world price changes are fully reflected in domestic prices.  Since the 
price safeguard is triggered by border prices this is an appropriate assumption.  However, if domestic prices 
are partially insulated from world price changes the model will overstate fluctuations in imports, and hence 
trigger the use of the volume safeguard more often than warranted.  Since sufficient data to estimate the 
degree of price insulation for the low income countries included in this study are difficult to obtain, the 
results should be considered an upper bound for the use of the volume safeguard.    
10 The AGLINK model elasticities were provided to the authors by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada.  
However, none of the results in this study should be attributed to AAFC or OECD.  The elasticities used are 
provided in Grant and available from the authors upon request.   7
  In order to simulate the operation of the volume safeguard of the SSM, pseudo-
random error terms are added to the supply and food demand equations
11.  Random 
shocks in an individual country’s wheat supply and food wheat demand result in random 
net imports.  As net imports increase the volume trigger of the safeguard mechanism can 
be breached and the importing country allowed to impose a safeguard duty.  Because of 
the pseudo-random errors not all importers will breach the volume trigger at the same 
time.  
  
  Modeling the price safeguard is more challenging.  If nothing else is done prices 
will vary as the random supply and demand shocks are applied to the model.  However, 
all countries will face the same world market price and with fixed exchange rates 
domestic price variability across all countries will be similar, depending only on the size 
of their ad valorem tariffs.  In order to introduce some differentiation in local price 
movements a pseudo-random error term is attached to the exchange rate in each country’s 
price linkage equation
12.  Although it is impossible to introduce shipment-by-shipment 
price variability; in this way some countries will be applying the price safeguard while 
others are not, and the size of the additional duty allowed by the price safeguard varies 
across countries depending on the size of the error term.   
 
  The model contains 38 countries/regions.  Six of the countries/regions are net 
exporters and 32 are net importers. The 32 net importers consist of 23 individual 
countries, accounting for every country with net imports of wheat averaging more than 
1.0 million metric tons (mmt) over 1999-2001.  The remaining net importers are 
aggregated into groups based on region and economic development.  Data on the supply, 
distribution and trade flows of wheat are obtained from the PS&D database (USDA 
2002b).  While this database provides data for many countries, it does not include data 
for all low income and non-WTO countries.  Where data are missing FAOSTAT data are 
employed (FAO).  World prices for wheat are taken from the OECD’s database and 
reflect the free on board (fob) US dollar price per metric ton of wheat.  Exchange rate 
data for all countries are taken from the USDA Agricultural Exchange Rate Database and 
the International Monetary Fund’s Financial Statistics Yearbook for the period 1999-
2001 (IMF, OECD, USDA 2002a).  Tariff data and other border measures are taken 
primarily from the Agricultural Market Access Database (AMAD) and, in some cases, 




                                            
11 To obtain the pseudo-random error terms an individual country’s production and food demand were 
regressed on a linear trend for the time period 1990 to 2001.  The random errors from these regressions 
were then used to obtain a variance-covariance matrix that takes into account the correlations among the 
error terms, across countries, and this matrix was used to generate 1,000 pseudo-random error terms. More 
details on the way the pseudo-random errors were generated and some modifications made to them for the 
empirical analysis are contained in Grant. 
12 To obtain the exchange rate pseudo-random errors the regressions were based on three years of monthly 
data in an attempt to account for short-run variations in exchange rates and not structural changes that 
occurred in the early 1990’s in many low income countries.   8
Policy Set 
  The primary policies considered in this study are border policies, tariffs in 
particular.  However, before moving to a detailed discussion of tariffs it is important to 
outline the other policies explicitly incorporated into the model.  In terms of domestic 
policies only the United States loan rate and the EU’s intervention price are considered.  
In the United States the average loan rate (1999-2001) was US$94.80/mt and the average 
farm price was US$96.63/mt.  Hence, in the baseline simulations the loan rate is not 
binding.  However, in the stochastic simulations the farm price often drops below the 
loan rate.  In this case, the price received by U.S. producers is not allowed to fall below 
the loan rate and the government cost of an implied deficiency payment equal to the 
difference between the loan rate and the market price is calculated.  Consumer prices in 
the U.S. are allowed to follow market prices to levels below the loan rate.     
 
  Calibrating the model in the EU is more difficult
13.  The EU paid substantial 
export subsidies in 1999 and 2000 when the intervention price was 119 euro/mt, and 
almost no export subsidies were paid in 2001 when the intervention price was 101 
euro/mt.  The WTO notifications show that EU export subsidy payments averaged 15 
euro/mt for the three years 1999-2001. In the model, it is assumed that the EU farm price 
equals the average intervention price and a 15 euro/mt export subsidy payment is 
incorporated by defining an EU export price for wheat.  This export price is equal to the 
farm price minus 15 euro/mt or 95.6 euro/mt.  In the stochastic simulations when the 
world price falls below the 110.6 euro/mt intervention price the appropriate export 
subsidy is calculated. However, in each of the liberalization scenarios the intervention 
price is lowered from 110.6 euro/mt to 101 euro/mt, its actual value since 2001, and 
export subsidies are then calculated relative to the 101 euro/mt export price.   
 
  For this study the tariffs in all countries are converted to their ad valorem 
equivalents.  Figure 2 shows the simple average difference in bound and applied tariffs 
for developed, developing and least developed net importing countries.  The first thing to 
note is the huge gap between bound and applied tariffs. The simple average difference 
between bound and applied tariffs for all 32 net importing countries is 61 percentage 
points.  For the 23 countries with bound tariffs of 100 percent or less only one country 
applies a tariff above 50 percent.  Four of the nine countries with bound tariffs above 100 
percent apply tariffs below 25 percent.  Figure 2 raises the question of why countries with 
such large gaps between their bound and applied tariffs are worried about a Special 
Safeguard Mechanism?  It appears that undesirable import surges could be remedied by 
raising applied tariffs, but there are at least three reasons why a country might not want to 
do this.  First, the applied tariffs might be specified in domestic legislation and not easily 
changed.  Second, raising applied tariffs makes it clear that the government is favoring 
domestic producers over domestic consumers.  Finally, while wheat tariffs might not be a 
problem for most low income countries, there may be a few politically sensitive 
commodities where applied and bound tariffs are similar.  If a country wants an SSM, for 
even a few commodities, it must support the proposal to create this mechanism. 
 
                                            
13 The EU is defined to include the 25 current member countries.   9
  The data on applied and bound tariffs make it clear that only aggressive tariff 
cutting exercises in the wheat sector will have a significant liberalizing effect.  For 
example, if the DDR negotiators agree on an UR formula for cutting tariffs (a 36 percent 
cut to bound rates) it would be binding for only one country (Egypt) and only because 
Egypt’s applied and bound tariffs are both five percent
14.   
  
Expected Outcomes   
  Before proceeding to the empirical analysis it is useful to have an idea of what 
outcomes to expect.  The expected direction of change in the mean values of key 
variables is relatively straightforward.  However, an SSM has an implied objective of 
market stability although exactly what is to be stabilized is often left unstated.  Since the 
SSM is triggered by changes in prices and import quantities it seems reasonable to 
monitor the stability of these variables, especially given the current design of the 
safeguard mechanism.   
 
  The work of Zwart and Meilke provides a theoretical framework that is useful for 
this purpose although they only considered random supply shocks.  Consider the 
following two-country model that includes random errors on supply and demand: 
 
DE = a – bPW + ε1,          ( 7) 
  SE = c + dPW + ε2,          ( 8 )  
  DI = e – fPD + ε3,          ( 9 )  
  SI = g + hPD + ε4,          ( 1 0 )  
 SE  –  DE  =  DI  –  SI,         (11) 
 PD  =  γPW           ( 12) 
where,  DE represents demand in the exporting nation, SE is supply in the exporting 
nation, DI and SI are demand and supply in the importing region respectively, PW is the 
world price and PD is the importer’s domestic price of the commodity.  The random error 
term, εi, is assumed to be normally and independently distributed:  ) , 0 ( ~
2
i i N σ ε  for i = 
1…4. Parameters (a) through (h) are supply and demand constants and slope coefficients 
and γ equals (1 + t) where t is the applied ad valorem tariff. 
 
   Zwart and Meilke show that when γ =1 (a free trade scenario), the domestic price 
equals the world price (PW) with expected value E[PW] and variance, var[PW]: 
 
                                            
14 The 36 percent average tariff reduction applied to developed countries, developing countries were 
required to reduce tariffs, on average, by only 24 percent.   10
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The form of policy intervention in the empirical SSM model is an ad valorem tariff as 
well as a safeguard mechanism that enters asymmetrically
15.  That is, the safeguard duty 
is applied if the volume or price safeguard is triggered.  Equation (15) illustrates this 
specification. 
 
  PD = γPW + δ(VT)PW + θ( P T ) P W        ( 1 5 )  
where,  
  γ = (1+t) and (t) is the ad valorem tariff; 
  δ = 0.33t and is the additional duty allowed under the volume safeguard; 
θ  is the additional duty allowed under the price safeguard and the size of θ 
increases the further the world price falls below the domestic price (Figure 1); and 
 
VT and PT are dummy variables equal to one when the volume safeguard (VT) or 
price safeguard (PT) is triggered, and zero otherwise
16. 
 
Because it is the importing country that implements a tariff and the SSM, equations (9) 
and (10) can be re-expressed as, 
 
  DI = e – f(γPW + δ(VT)PW + θ(PT)PW) + ε3,  and     (16) 
  SI = g + h(γPW + δ(VT)PW + θ(PT)PW) + ε4.      ( 1 7 )  
If neither the price nor the volume based safeguard is triggered (VT = PT = 0), the 
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,   a n d        ( 18) 
                                            
15 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
16 Members are not allowed to use the volume and price safeguard concurrently, so if PT=VT=1 we assume 
the importer will select the safeguard with the highest additional duty and equation (15) becomes: 
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The variance of the domestic price in the importing region is (Zwart and Meilke), 




















=      (20) 
  Now assume that in addition to the importer’s applied tariff (γ), conditions are 
such that the SSM is also triggered.  Whether the price or volume safeguard is triggered 
(or both) depends on the state of the world.  For the volume safeguard, when VT = 1 and 
PT = 0 equations (16) and (17) become  
 
DI = e – f(γPW + δPW) + ε3 ,   a n d        ( 21) 
  SI = g + h(γPW + δPW) + ε4.        ( 2 2 )  
The expected value and variance of world price is then 
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       ( 2 4 )  
With the volume safeguard the domestic price is, 
  PD = γPW + δPW = (1 + t + 0.33t)PW = (γ + δ)PW,    (25) 
and the variance of the domestic price is, 
 Var[PD]  =  (γ + δ)
2V a r [ P W ]           ( 2 6 )  
 Equations  (18) through (20) and (23) through (26) illustrate three things.  First, 
the expected value and the variance of world price (domestic price) decreases (increases) 
when an importing nation imposes a tariff because γ = (1+t) is greater than one, thereby 
increasing the denominator (numerator) in equations (18) through (20).  Second, the 
expected value and variance of world price (domestic price) is further decreased 
(increased) when the volume safeguard is triggered because δ is positive. Calculations for 
the price safeguard are analogous to the volume equations shown above with δ being 
replaced by θ.     12
Policy Scenarios                
  The most detailed tariff cutting proposals tabled in the DDR are the cuts from 
bound rates contained in Mr. Harbinson’s draft text of 18 March 2003 and the United 
States early proposal to employ a Swiss-25 tariff reduction formula from applied rates 
(WTO 2003b)
17.  The tariff cuts proposed by Harbinson are shown in table 1.  The 
Harbinson formula contains a harmonization element with high tariffs subject to larger 
cuts than small tariffs.  In addition, the commitments for developing countries are lower 
than for developed countries.  However, given the huge gap between bound and applied 
tariffs the Harbinson formula, using average tariff cuts to bound rates, would only lower 
applied tariffs in four countries: Japan (225 to 158 percent), Egypt (5 to 3.8 percent), the 
developed country group ( 121.5 to 81 percent) and the EU (62 to 37 percent)
18.  The 
tariff cut in the EU is important because there are cases where the tariff is not high 
enough to “protect” the EU’s intervention price and in such cases, the EU may become a 
net importer of wheat.  However, as revealed in the next section the Harbinson tariff cuts 
do not imply much liberalization of market access.   
 
  In order to analyze a more aggressive tariff cutting exercise the second scenario 
involves the use of a Swiss-25 harmonization formula to cut tariffs from applied rates. 
Under this scenario, all applied tariffs are cut to 25 percent or less, and the tariff cutting 
exercise is binding on all countries.  Hence, the two scenarios involve one very 
conservative scenario, at least as far as reducing applied tariffs in the wheat sector are 
concerned, and one aggressive scenario where all applied tariffs are reduced.  In both of 
these liberalization exercises the EU’s intervention price is lowered from 110.6 euro/mt 
to 101.25 euro/mt while US domestic policies are left unaltered.   
 
  In all, four policy experiments are reported in tables 2 and 3: 1) Harbinson with 
no SSM (scenario 1); 2) Swiss-25 with no SSM (scenario 2); 3) Harbinson with an SSM 
(scenario 3); and 4) Swiss-25 with an SSM (scenario 4).  Scenarios one and two are 
compared to the status quo simulation and scenarios three and four are compared to the 
comparable scenario with no SSM to isolate the price and welfare effects of an SSM.  
The comparisons are based on the results obtained and averaged over 1000 drawings of 
pseudo-random errors.  As a result it is possible to measure the number of times the SSM 
is triggered and its effects on the stability of all of the endogenous variables.     
 
  In evaluating the results with an SSM it is helpful to know the additional SSM 
duties and the frequency of SSM use for the 24 low income WTO countries that are 
                                            
17 The Work Programme agreed to by WTO Members in 2004 commits members to a “tiered” tariff cutting 
formula, but the exact formula and the parameters remain under negotiation.  The Harbinson formula 
encompasses a tiered approach and proves a good example of a modest tariff cutting outcome. 
18 For example, to calculate Japan’s tariff cut from 225 percent to 158 percent note that Japan is a 
developed country and faces a reduction commitment of 60 percent since its current bound tariff rate of 396 
percent is greater than the 90 percent threshold contained in Harbinson’s tiered tariff cutting formula (see 
table 1).  Define t0 as the original bound tariff rate prior to any reduction commitment, ta as Japans original 
applied tariff rate and tN as the new bound tariff rate after a 60 percent Harbinson reduction commitment. 
Then, tN = t0(1- 0.60) = 158 percent.  Because tN < ta, the reduction commitment is binding and for 
modeling purposes, Japan’s applied tariff rate is reduced to 158 percent.   13
eligible to apply the safeguard mechanism (table 4)
19. Note that the additional duty 
allowed under the volume safeguard (δ) is usually greater than the additional duty 
allowed with the price safeguard (θ), when the degree of trade liberalization is 
conservative (table 4, scenario 3).  This is due to the fact that most applied tariffs are 
unaffected under a conservative liberalization scenario that cuts bound tariffs but does not 
force a reduction in applied tariffs. In this case, the volume safeguard will decrease 
(increases) the mean and variance of the world price (domestic price) more than the price 
safeguard. For the aggressive tariff cutting scenario where all applied tariffs are reduced, 
table 4 shows that in some cases the additional duty allowed under the price safeguard (θ) 
is larger than under the volume safeguard (δ) (e.g., compare scenarios 3 and 4 for 
Morocco and Nigeria in table 4). 
 
  Because the objective of this study is to estimate the effects of an SSM on market 
stability and economic welfare, the discussion of the results focus primarily on scenarios 
three and four
20. Table 2 summarizes the price and stability effects of all four policy 
scenarios and table 3 summarizes the welfare effects.  A full list of individual country 
results for scenarios three and four are given in tables 5 and 6. 
 
Scenario 1: Harbinson Tariff Cuts with No SSM 
  In terms of the price and welfare effects, the impacts of the Harbinson (HB) 
scenario on most countries are small (scenario 1, tables 2 and 3).  World prices rise but 
by only 3.4 percent and most of this price rise (2.5 percentage points) is due to the 
lowering of the EU intervention price because the HB tariff cutting proposal is binding on 
only four countries. Domestic prices in all three net importing countries that reduce tariffs 
become more stable while domestic prices are slightly less stable for 30 out of 31 net 
importing countries not making tariff cuts (scenario 1, table 2).   
 
  The welfare findings are summarized using four country groupings (table 3)
21.  
Low income countries (developing plus least developed) suffer small welfare losses from 
the lowering of bound tariffs and the EU intervention price (scenario 1, table 3).  The 
losses stem from the decline in consumer surplus from higher food prices, and in some 
cases (Egypt) from losses in tariff revenue as importers reduce their demand for higher 
priced imports.  In the EU and US the cost of their domestic support programs (not 
                                            
19 The results are judged with respect to 31 low income countries.  However, only 24 of these countries are 
WTO Members and for modeling purposes only these countries are given the right to apply the SSM. 
20 Individual county results for the pure tariff liberalization scenarios without an SSM are available from 
the authors upon request. 
21 The countries in each group are:  1) Developed Country Exporters – Australia, Canada, EU-25 and the 
USA; 2) Developed Country Importers – Israel, Japan and an aggregated developed country group (DCG) 
consisting of Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland; 3) Developing Countries – Algeria, 
Argentina, Brazil, China, Columbia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, South Korea, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela and six geographically 
aggregated groups consisting of African developing countries (AFD), Central American developing 
countries (CTA), South American developing countries (STA), Asian developing countries (ASG), Middle 
East developing countries (MEG) and a  Rest of the World (ROW) group; 4) Least Developed Countries – 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Yemen and two geographically aggregated groups consisting of South African least 
developed countries (SAG) and North African least developed countries (NAG).   14
shown) fall by 96 and 75 percent respectively ($157 and $90 million).  Globally, world 
welfare increases by 0.65 percent or $716 million (scenario 1, table 3)).  However, the 
distribution of welfare changes in the Harbinson scenario are mixed with the developed 
country importers gaining 11.8 percent on average and developing and least developed 
countries loosing 1.8 and 2.4 percent respectively (scenario 1, table 3).  
 
Scenario 2: Swiss-25 Tariff Cuts with No SSM 
  Applying a Swiss-25 tariff cutting formula, from applied rates, results in all 
countries with positive tariffs facing a reduction commitment.  As a result, world prices 
rise 5.7 percent (scenario 2, table 2)
22.  Following the tariff cuts 25 low income countries 
face higher domestic prices, and, with the exception of Indonesia, prices are stabilized in 
all low income countries. 
    
  World welfare increases by 1.6 percent or $1.8 billion (scenario 2, table 3). Table 
3 shows that the welfare gains in the developed country exporters (2.1 percent) are 
greater than in the HB scenario (1.3 percent).  Again, the major gains under a Swiss-25 
tariff cut accrue to developed country importers (28.5 percent), where steep applied 
tariffs are cut to less than 25 percent. Low income countries, as a group, lose more 
economic welfare under the Swiss-25 scenario than under the Harbinson scenario but this 
time the results vary greatly across countries depending on the initial levels of distortion.   
 
  We now turn to a discussion of the effects of an SSM when it is combined with a 
particular tariff cutting formula. A summary of the price and stability effects of scenarios 
three and four are presented in table 2 and the welfare effects of these scenarios are 
summarized in table 3.  Tables 5 and 6 present the results for all of the individual 
countries. 
 
Scenario 3: Harbinson Tariff Cuts with an SSM 
  In this scenario, the Harbinson tariff cutting proposal with an SSM is compared to 
the Harbinson tariff cutting proposal without an SSM.  The SSM results in domestic 
prices rising in 19 of 31 low income countries and becoming less stable in 16 of 31 low 
income countries (scenario 3, table 2).  However, imports in 26 low income countries are 
stabilized, and the standard deviation of net trade is reduced by over ten percent in eight 
low income countries (table 5). World prices fall slightly (-0.2 percent) as a result of the 
SSM causing increased production and lower consumption in the majority of, low income 
countries.  
 
  Morocco and Nigeria experience large increases in the standard deviation of 
domestic prices because of the size and frequency with which they apply safeguard duties 
(table 4 and table 5).  Table 4 shows that Morocco and Nigeria apply the volume 
safeguard 35 and 29 percent of the time (350 and 290 times out of 1000) and the 
additional duties for these two countries are among the highest at 16.2 and 26.9 percent 
                                            
22 In this scenario, a smaller fraction of the world price increase is attributed to the lowering of the EU-25 
intervention price at 1.86 percent.   15
respectively.  Both countries use the price safeguard less than 0.30 percent of the time 
(less than 3 times out of 1000). For Ethiopia, a 0.87 percent increase in its average 
domestic price comes with a 3.86 percent increase in price volatility (table 5).  In 
Ethiopia’s case, the additional duty under the volume safeguard is small (1.7 percent) but 
the frequency with which Ethiopia uses the volume safeguard is the highest of all the low 
income countries at 66 percent (table 4).  Conversely, least developed African countries 
(NAG and SAG regions) increase and stabilize their domestic price of wheat (table 5) 
because they apply the volume SSM in moderation (22 and 13 percent respectively) and 
they apply smaller SSM duties at just over 2.0 percent (table 4).   
 
  In summary, Morocco and Nigeria increased their domestic price instability by 
applying relatively high additional duties even though these duties are applied less 
frequently than in the case of Ethiopia.  Ethiopia increases its domestic price instability 
by using the SSM much more frequently even though it applies a lower additional duty 
compared to Morocco and Nigeria.  In the ideal case, NAG and SAG countries increase 
and stabilize their domestic prices by applying small additional duties relatively 
infrequently. 
 
    Among the exporting nations, Canada suffers a drop in its price of wheat (-0.20 
percent) and an increase in its producer price variability of 2.6 percent (table 5).  The 
small decrease in world price caused by the SSM is accompanied by small reductions in 
the domestic price variation in the US (-0.16 percent) and the EU (-0.04 percent), 
however, the tiny drop in the world price increases the cost of domestic farm programs by 
18.4 percent in the US and 5.4 percent in the EU (table 5). 
 
  The welfare cost of an SSM under the Harbinson proposal is $146 million (table 
5). This needs to be taken in context with the welfare gain from trade liberalization under 
the Harbinson formula of $716 million. Thus, almost 80 percent of the increase in world 
welfare is still realized when low income countries are granted an SSM.  
 
  As shown in table 3 (scenario 3), developed country welfare for both net exporters 
and net importers is nearly unchanged as a result of the application of the SSM.  For the 
US and the EU, slightly lower food and feed prices almost offset the increases in 
domestic program costs (table 5).  Individual developing countries tend to gain by using 
the SSM, however the losses in the AFD (-0.26 percent), Morocco (-0.36 percent) and 
Nigeria (-4.0 percent) are large enough to result in an average loss (-0.11 percent) for all 
developing countries (scenario 3, table 3).    
 
Scenario 4: Swiss-25 Tariff Cuts with an SSM 
  The results of allowing an SSM along with the reduction of applied tariffs using a 
Swiss-25 formula are summarized in tables 2 and 3 (scenario 4).  Domestic prices in 16 
of 31 low income countries rise from use of the SSM and domestic prices are stabilized in 
18 countries.  Imports decline in 19 of 31 low income countries but are stabilized in a 
remarkable 27 of 31 low income countries.  On this criterion alone the SSM would have 
to be considered a major success.     16
 
  Under the Swiss-25 scenario the world welfare cost of the SSM is only $133 
million compared to a welfare gain of $1.79 billion from liberalization using a Swiss-25 
formula with no SSM (table 6).  Developed exporting nations lose slightly (-0.07 percent) 
in terms of net national welfare (scenario 4, table 3) and in the case of the US and EU, 
both countries face rising costs of their domestic programs of 17.8 and 4.4 percent 
respectively (table 6). With this more aggressive tariff cutting scenario, almost 93 percent 
of the increase in world welfare is still realized when low income countries are granted an 
SSM.  The low cost of the SSM stems from the fact that the additional duties allowed 
under the volume safeguard decline as applied tariffs fall.  
  
  Among the developing countries, Mexico and Nigeria lose economic welfare as 
average prices increase 2.8 and 7.4 percent but this rise is accompanied by a significant 
decline in the standard deviation of domestic prices of 7.7 and 22.8 respectively (table 6).  
Again, the reduction in the standard deviation of prices (and net imports) in these 
countries can be explained in terms of how often the SSM is triggered and the magnitude 
of the additional SSM duties (table 4).  Although Mexico applies the volume trigger more 
often in scenario four than in scenario three (770 versus 250 respectively) the additional 
duty is roughly one-half as large as in scenario four (4.4 percent in scenario 4 versus 9.2 
percent in scenario 3).  Because the tariff cuts in scenario four are more aggressive, 
Nigeria relies more on the price safeguard (930 times) but applies an SSM duty of 14.7 
percent, roughly one-half the level it applied in scenario three using the volume 
safeguard. In the Philippines, economic welfare rises when the Swiss-25 tariff reductions 
are combined with an SSM policy and prices and net imports are stabilized by over ten 
percent (table 6).   
 
  In terms of the least developed countries, Ethiopia loses slightly (-0.01 percent) as 
the increases in tariff revenue and producer surplus of 40.5 and 1.8 percent are not 
enough to offset the loss in consumer surplus of 1.5 percent.  Least developed NAG and 
SAG regions gain economic welfare and prices in both countries are stabilized, as are net 




  Summarizing the results of the SSM analysis is difficult because in some sense 
each country has a different stake in the trade negotiations depending on its initial tariff 
levels and its trade position in the wheat market.  However, some general observations 
are possible.   
 
  First, an examination of the individual country results (not reported) from trade 
liberalization scenarios one and two reveals that 29 out of 31 (27 out of 31) low income 
countries lose economic welfare under Harbinson (Swiss-25) suggesting that these 
countries are unlikely to be enthusiastic supporters of reducing their own tariffs.  These 
results are similar to those obtained by Vanzetti and Peters in a more comprehensive 
analysis of the effects of trade liberalization on developing countries.  Conversely, 
developed countries, both importers and exporters gain from wheat trade liberalization.    17
Thus, if developed countries should unilaterally liberalize their own trade, it is likely that 
reform by low income countries will minimize their welfare losses and make them better 
off relative to developed country reform only.  
 
  Second, the potential use of the SSM increases as the degree of trade 
liberalization increases and domestic prices fall.  With Harbinson reforms low income 
countries would be able to use the SSM about 21 percent of the time and would almost 
always apply the volume safeguard.  With Swiss-25 reforms low income countries would 
have the right to apply SSM duties nearly 40 percent of the time and although the volume 
safeguard would still be the dominant instrument, the price safeguard would account for 
about 8 percent of the SSM actions. 
 
  Third, the larger the trade reforms, the smaller (larger) the average volume 
safeguard  (price safeguard) duty. Under Harbinson reforms the average volume (price) 
safeguard duty is 5.2 (1.3) percent and under the Swiss-25 reforms the average volume-
based (price-based) SSM duty is 2.5 (4.5) percent. 
 
  Fourth, under the Harbinson reform scenario with an SSM six low income 
countries lose economic welfare compared to a scenario with no SSM, and the loss of 
consumer surplus in two countries is greater than two percent: Nigeria (-13.0 percent) and 
Africa Developing Group (-2.4 percent).  The same is true, although the magnitudes are 
smaller, for these same two countries using an SSM under Swiss-25 reforms.    
 
  Fifth, the SSM, especially under Swiss-25 reforms significantly stabilizes the 
level of imports in 27 of 31 low income countries and stabilizes producer surplus in 23 of 
28 low income countries. Furthermore, if we restrict our attention to the 24 out of 31 low 
income WTO countries that are allowed to invoke the safeguard, prices are stabilized in 
18 of 24 countries and imports are stabilized in a notable 23 of 24 countries under Swiss-
25 reforms.   
 
  Sixth, as the tariff cuts get more aggressive the gains in economic welfare not 
only get bigger but the cost of allowing an SSM becomes smaller.  This result is more 
obvious in Grant (2003) where he considered a larger range of tariff cutting scenarios.  
 
Finally, we have not explored empirically the implications of safeguard rules 
other than those used under the current SSG.  Sharma sheds some light on this issue by 
calculating the additional tariffs that would be necessary to completely stabilize domestic 
prices relative to a moving average trend.  However, it is hard to imagine that trade 
negotiators will agree on an SSM policy that is flexible enough for developing countries 
to almost completely stabilize their domestic prices. Valdes and Foster calculate the 
required tariff levels that would be necessary to prevent Chile’s wheat and sugar prices 
from falling below a historical trend. Their results, which are consistent with Sharma, 
show that tariffs in the neighborhood of 20 to 40 percent would suffice. Yet, neither study 
looked at the impact of stabilizing domestic prices on imports, producer surplus or total 
welfare.   
    18
  The key issue with any safeguard will be how often it is applied and how large the 
additional duties are when it is used.  Our Swiss-25 results suggest that a frequently used 
SSM costs developed exporting nations far less than one percent of the gains from 
liberalization that would be realized without an SSM as long as the additional duties are 
small (in only two cases do the safeguard duties average more than 10 percent). Hence, if 
developing countries are willing to accept larger cuts in tariffs in return for an SSM, it is 
trade-off developed countries should accept – at least at far as the wheat market is 
concerned.    19
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Figure 1: Effect on import price of the price safeguard 
 
 
Figure 2:  Average bound and applied wheat tariffs for developed, developing and 
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Table 1:  Harbinson tariff reduction commitments 
Development Status  Agricultural Tariff  Average Tariff Cut*  Minimum Tariff Cut* 
Developed  T > 90%  60%  45% 
  15% < T ≤  90%  50%  35% 
 T  ≤ 15%  40%  25% 
Developing  T > 120%  40%  30% 
  60% < T ≤ 120%  35%  25% 
  20% < T ≤ 60%  30%  20% 
 T  ≤ 20%  25%  15% 
 “SP”  Products*  10%  5% 
* Average and minimum tariff cuts are from bound rates as contained in WTO (2003b).     
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Table 2.  Price and stability effects for low income countries 
   Scenarios 1 and 2 - No SSM
a  Scenarios 3 and 4 - With an SSM
b 










  Up  Down  More  Less Up Down  More  Less Up  Down More Less  Up  Down More Less 
Domestic Price  31 0  30 1 25  6 30 1 19 12 16  15  16 15 18  13 
Producer Surplus  28 0 13  15  22  6 18  10  17 11  21  7  15  13  23  5 
Imports  3  28  27 4  9  22 27 4  9  22 26 5 12 19 27 4 
   World Price Increase = 3.42%  World Price Increase = 5.65%  World Price Decrease = 0.20%  World Price Decrease = 0.19% 
a Scenarios 1 and 2 are measured relative to the baseline simulation calibrated to average supply, demand and tariff rates for the years 1999-2001. 
b  Scenarios 3 and 4 are measured relative to the corresponding scenarios 1 and 2. 
c   The results in the table show the number of countries in each category.  For domestic price and imports, there are 31 low income countries.  For producer        
surplus, three low income countries (Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines) have no wheat production for a total of 28 countries in this category. 
 
Table 3.  Aggregate changes in welfare  
   Scenarios 1 and 2 - No SSM
a  Scenarios 3 and 4 - With an SSM
b 
  (1) Harbinson  (2) Swiss-25  (3) Harbinson  (4) Swiss-25 
  Gain
c Loss
c  Welfare ∆ (%)  Gain
c  Loss
c  Welfare ∆ (%)  Gain
c  Loss
c  Welfare ∆ (%)  Gain
c  Loss
c  Welfare ∆ (%) 
Developed Exporters  4  0 1.31 4  0 2.09 0  4 -0.07 0  4 -0.07 
Developed Importers  2  1 11.78 2  1 28.50 3  0  0.11  3  0  0.07 
Developing Countries  2  24 -1.80  4  22 -1.97 20  6  -0.11 19  7  0.02 
Least Developed Countries  0  5 -2.44 0  5 -3.94 5  0 0.13  4  1 0.13 
World  8  30 0.65 10  28 1.61 28  10 -0.13 26  12 -0.12 
a Scenarios 1 and 2 are measured relative to the baseline simulation calibrated to average supply, demand and tariffs for the years 1999-2001. 
b Scenarios 3 and 4 are measured relative to the corresponding scenarios 1 and 2. 
c The results for Gain and Loss show the number of countries in each category. For a listing of countries in each category see endnote 20. 
Welfare ∆ (%) is the average change in aggregate economic welfare for the countries belonging to a particular category.  
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Table 4.  Frequency of use and average additional duties under the SSM  
  Scenario 3 - Harbinson  Scenario 4 – Swiss-25 
  SSM Duty (%)  SSM Frequency (%)  SSM Duty (%)  SSM Frequency (%) 
Country Price
a   Volume
a   Price






Developing            
Algeria 1.7  0.9  1.0  18  0.2  0.8  0.1  13 
Brazil 7.1  4.3  1.6  27  7.8  2.9  3.3  31 
Columbia 2.3  5.0  0.8  14  3.0  3.1  1.5  21 
Egypt 2.5  1.3  1.2  27  1.5  1.4  0.3  20 
Indonesia 10.5  0.0  12  0  9.2  0.0  9.0  0.0 
Malaysia 0.7  3.7  0.2  6.5  0.4  2.5  0.2  7.7 
Mexico 1.4  9.2  0.1  25  4.3  4.4  0.3  77 
Morocco 2.9  16.2  0.3  35  10.0  5.5  21  78 
Nigeria 0.8  26.9  0.1  29  14.7  6.4  93  6.3 
Peru 0.9  6.7  0.2  19  2.2  3.7  1.6  33 
Philipinnes 3.1  4.9  0.1  15  3.0  3.1  0.1  25 
South Korea  2.4  1.4  0.3  20  1.6  1.2  0.2  14 
Tunisia 2.1  0.0  1.5  0  3.0  3.7  1.5  61 
United A.E.  0.7  1.4  0.1  39  0.0  1.2  0.0  37 
Venezuela 1.3  5.0  0.4  5.0  1.0  3.1  1.1  8.2 
AFD 2.3  9.7  0.2  23  5.0  4.5  3.2  66 
CTA 1.1  1.5  0.2  19  0.0  1.3  0.0  16 
STA 2.5  3.4  0.1  23  1.9  2.4  0.1  25 
ASG 1.5  3.3  0.1  20  1.4  2.3  0.1  22 
Least Developed             
Bangladesh 1.2  1.8  0.5  7.3  0.6  1.5  0.1  6.5 
Ethiopia 1.0  1.7  0.1  66  0.0  1.4  0.0  63 
Yemen 1.4  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
NAG 2.1  2.2  0.3  22  1.1  1.7  0.1  9.3 
SAG 2.2  2.1  0.2  13  0.9  1.7  0.1  20 
Average (%)  2.3  5.2  1.0  20.0  4.5  2.5  8.0  27 
a Price (Volume) refers to the additional safeguard duty calculated in the model 
b Price (Volume) refers to how often the safeguard is triggered as a percentage out of 1000 pseudo-random error draws.   25
Table 5.  Scenario 3 - Harbinson tariff cuts with an SSM 
   Wheat Variables - Percent Change 
  Price (%)  Production (%)  Total Use (%)  Net Trade (%) 
Consumer          
Surplus (%) 
Producer           
Surplus (%) 
Gov't              
Revenue (%) 
Net               
Welfare (%) 
COUNTRY Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev 
Developed                  
Australia  -0.20 1.77 -0.11 -0.20 0.05 1.18 -0.18 -0.22 0.08 0.45 -0.29 -0.45  ----  ----   -0.13 -0.43 
Canada  -0.20 2.65 -0.12 -0.16 0.13 2.03 -0.22 -0.12 0.08 0.26 -0.29 -0.19  ----  ----   -0.12 -0.30 
EU-25
b  -0.04 -0.34 -0.02 -0.41 0.02 -0.32 -2.02 -1.23 0.05 -0.25 -0.06 -1.05 5.36  4.28  0.00 -0.11 
Israel  -0.20 2.33 -0.08 2.33 0.11 1.36 0.12 1.41 0.03 0.03 -0.24 2.22 -0.08 1.14 0.05 0.07 
Japan  -0.19 0.88 -0.26 0.26 0.13 0.70 0.15 0.73 0.23 0.74 -0.45 -0.01 0.08 -0.08 0.18 0.60 
USA
b  -0.16 0.53 -0.07 -0.04 0.10 2.27 -0.28 -0.16 0.04 0.21 -0.20 -0.20  18.38  11.86  -0.03 -0.21 
DCG  -0.20 2.02 -0.30 0.94 0.09 0.50 0.34 1.07 0.14 0.27 -0.56 0.57 0.12 -0.06 0.10 0.18 
Developing                  
Algeria  -0.04 0.69 -0.03 -0.45 0.01 -0.81 0.02 -1.19 0.02 -0.81 -0.11 -0.61 6.62  149.28  0.06 0.00 
Argentina  -0.20 3.16 -0.11 -0.14 0.06 0.27 -0.18 -0.13 0.13 0.34 -0.28 -0.18  ----  ----   -0.12 -0.24 
Brazil  0.79 -8.44 0.55 -2.95 -0.46 -8.42 -0.81 -9.21 -0.89 -8.97 0.91 -3.11 8.71  143.26  0.05 -0.13 
China  -0.19 2.87 -0.03 -0.17 0.13 2.23 -6.13 -0.62 0.25 2.28 -0.21 -0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 
Columbia  0.39 -3.41  ----  ----    -0.14 -5.92 -0.14 -5.92 -0.32 -6.51 0.39 -3.41 4.53 134.87 0.10  0.07 
Egypt  0.12 -1.47 0.06 -1.61 -0.03 -1.72 -0.11 -2.95 -0.06 -1.79 0.14 -2.20 9.66  135.33  0.03 -0.03 
Indonesia  -0.02 -2.82  ----  ----    0.02 -1.39 0.02 -1.39 -0.03 -1.76  ----  ----    C  D  0.42 0.40 
Iran  -0.20 2.87 -0.13 0.06 0.04 0.14 0.27 0.15 0.08 0.18 -0.29  -0.02 ----  ----   0.03 0.06 
Iraq  -0.20 3.16 -0.13 0.08 0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.28 -0.05  ----  ----    0.03 0.01 
Kazakhstan  -0.20 0.48 -0.10 -0.01 0.06 0.08 -0.28 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.26 -0.13  ----  ----   -0.05 -0.05 
Malaysia  0.01 -0.82  ----  ----    0.00 -2.85 0.00 -2.85 -0.01 -3.08  ----  ----    1.98  121.81  0.11 0.51 
Mexico  1.51 -16.36 1.01 -13.00 -0.81 -16.64 -3.45 -24.52 -1.44 -15.47 2.13 -15.72 4.92 50.62 -0.17 -1.70 
Morocco  3.60 43.32 3.28  -10.64  -0.81 -1.03 -4.01  -17.26  -1.66 -2.02 4.75 -8.10 8.93 45.14  -0.36 1.22 
Nigeria  3.99 32.47 2.94  0.57 -6.23  -33.81  -6.47  -33.81  -12.98  -39.61 6.44  5.64  2.44 22.35 -3.97  -22.73 
a The percentage changes are measured relative to Harbinson tariff cuts with no SSM (scenario 1). 
b The figures under government revenue for the US and the EU show changes in the cost of their government programs. 
C = 8.8 million  
D = 32.8 million 
   26
Table 5 continued 
   Wheat Variables - Percent Change 
  Price (%)  Production (%)  Total Use (%)  Net Trade (%) 
Consumer          
Surplus (%) 
Producer           
Surplus (%) 
Gov't              
Revenue (%) 
Net                
Welfare (%) 
COUNTRY  Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev 
Peru  0.83 0.00 0.63 -1.38 -0.29 -9.17 -0.42  -11.00  -0.67  -10.01  1.33 -0.79 5.95  172.17  0.08 -0.05 
Philippinnes 0.39 -10.62  ----  ----    -0.41 -11.95 -0.40 -11.95 -0.31  -4.77  ----  ----    4.35 248.37 0.12  -0.28 
South Korea  0.05  -3.73  ----  ----   -0.05  -3.76  -0.05  -3.76  -0.05  -3.03  0.05  -3.73  6.54  707.73  0.23  1.19 
Tunisia  -0.19 1.78 -0.12 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.23 0.16 0.09 0.09 -0.27 0.05 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.03 
United A.E.  0.32  2.71  ----  ----   -0.17  -1.27  -0.17  -1.27  -0.44  -1.56  0.32  2.71  15.08  82.61  0.18  0.13 
Venezuela  0.01 -0.17 0.01 -0.22 0.00 -3.24 0.00 -3.25 -0.02 -3.60 0.01 -0.36 1.51 90.20 0.14 0.22 
AFD  1.46 -6.83 1.60 -4.00 -1.10  -15.50  -1.86  -19.52  -2.37  -17.29  2.87 -2.61 5.89 87.11  -0.26 -2.99 
CTA  0.06  1.06  ----  ----    -0.03 -2.42 -0.03 -2.42 -0.09 -2.70 0.06  1.06  6.44 167.64 0.20  0.42 
STA  0.46 -7.36 0.45 -6.85 -0.22 -6.80 -1.18  -10.42  -0.47 -7.18 0.78 -6.18 7.08 65.37 0.02 0.17 
ASG  0.37 -5.29 0.32 -3.39 -0.27 -7.48 -0.65  -10.20  -0.56 -7.38 0.54 -3.34 6.28  102.11  0.08 0.21 
MEG  -0.20 3.05  ----  ----   0.08 0.44 0.08 0.44 0.16 0.53 -0.20 3.05 0.80  241.87  0.15 0.54 
ROW  -0.20 3.05 -0.15 0.76 0.16 0.25 0.90 0.63 0.31 0.32 -0.31 0.89 0.66 0.10 0.06 0.10 
Least Developed                  
Bangladesh  -0.07 2.11 -0.03 -0.54 0.04 -0.96 0.13 -1.35 0.06 -1.14 -0.10 -0.69 3.43 30.21 0.06 0.12 
Ethiopia  0.87  3.86  0.35 -1.05 -0.43 -1.89 -2.86 -3.09 -0.90 -2.18 1.06 -1.30 24.88 35.06 0.01  0.02 
Yemen  -0.19 2.38 -0.05 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.16 0.17 -0.22 0.07  ----  ----   0.15 0.16 
SAG  0.04 -2.44 0.03 -0.88 -0.03 -3.81 -0.04 -4.04 -0.07 -4.21 0.06 -1.05 4.12  172.45  0.18 0.63 
NAG  0.24 -2.67 0.21 -0.48 -0.22 -4.77 -0.23 -4.82 -0.53 -5.48 0.41 -0.31 7.62 139.89 0.28  0.58 
WORLD  -0.20 3.16 -0.02 -0.43 -0.02 -0.43 0.00  0.00  ---- ----   ---- ----   ---- ----    -0.13 -4.48 
                             
  
Welfare Difference From Scenario 1 ($US) = $ -146 Million 
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Table 6.  Scenario 4 - Swiss-25 tariff cuts with an SSM
a 
   Wheat Variables - Percent Change 
  Price   (%)  Production (%)  Total Use (%)  Net Trade (%) 
Consumer        
Surplus (%) 
Producer       
Surplus (%) 
Gov't              
Revenue (%) 
Net             
Welfare (%) 
COUNTRY Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev 
Developed                  
Australia  -0.19 0.74 -0.11 -0.09 0.05 0.48 -0.17 -0.10 0.08 0.20 -0.27 -0.31  ----  ----   -0.12 -0.29 
Canada  -0.19 1.19 -0.12 -0.09 0.12 0.90 -0.21 -0.08 0.08 0.13 -0.27 -0.23  ----  ----   -0.12 -0.25 
EU-25
b  -0.10 -0.55 -0.06 -0.47 0.06 -0.55 -3.54 -1.15 0.11 -0.43 -0.14 -1.08 4.41  2.42  0.00 -0.13 
Israel  -0.19 1.00 -0.07 1.00 0.11 0.56 0.12 0.58 0.03 0.02 -0.23 0.92 -0.07 0.48 0.05 0.04 
Japan  -0.19 0.27 -0.33  -0.02 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.14 -0.48  -0.24  -0.14 0.32 0.07 0.13 
USA
b  -0.21 0.60 -0.10 -0.06 0.10 1.03 -0.33 -0.11 0.04 0.09 -0.27 -0.26  17.76  11.45  -0.03 -0.14 
DCG  -0.19 0.94 -0.37 0.26 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.31 0.08 0.08 -0.70  -0.11  -0.05  -0.07 0.07 0.07 
Developing                  
Algeria  -0.09 0.31 -0.06 -0.38 0.02 -0.50 0.04 -0.93 0.04 -0.48 -0.17 -0.56 4.68  131.22  0.06 0.06 
Argentina  -0.19 1.53 -0.10 -0.09 0.06 0.12 -0.17 -0.09 0.13 0.19 -0.26 -0.25  ----  ----   -0.12 -0.23 
Brazil  0.63 -7.25 0.43 -2.22 -0.36 -7.00 -0.63 -7.28 -0.70 -7.41 0.73 -2.43 10.82  165.51 0.08 -0.09 
China  -0.19 1.52 -0.03 -0.08 0.13 1.19 -3.66 -0.32 0.26 1.27 -0.21 -0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.10 
Columbia  0.37 -3.46  ----  ----    -0.13 -5.09 -0.13 -5.09 -0.29 -5.51 0.37 -3.46 6.67 176.21 0.11  0.06 
Egypt  0.07 -2.22 0.03 -1.75 -0.02 -1.58 -0.07 -2.84 -0.04 -1.66 0.08 -2.54 7.18 116.18 0.03  0.02 
Indonesia  -0.07 -2.15  ----  ----    0.08 -1.05 0.08 -1.05 0.10 -1.28  ----  ----    C  D  0.41 0.26 
Iran  -0.19 1.39 -0.12 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.27 0.08 0.07 0.11 -0.28  -0.10 ----  ----   0.03 0.04 
Iraq  -0.19 1.53 -0.12 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.28 -0.12  ----  ----    0.02 0.01 
Kazakhstan  -0.19 0.11 -0.10 -0.02 0.06 0.01 -0.27 -0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.25 -0.18  ----  ----   -0.05 -0.08 
Malaysia  -0.01 -1.66  ----  ----    0.00 -2.58 0.00 -2.58 0.00 -2.75  ----  ----    2.42  151.28  0.11 0.28 
Mexico  2.77 -7.69 1.80 -6.41 -1.29 -8.58 -4.73  -12.59  -2.24 -8.36 4.05 -7.07  20.33  99.41  -0.12 -0.28 
Morocco  4.05 -0.14 3.62 -1.62 -0.69 -0.97 -2.96 -2.74 -1.43 -1.67 6.74  1.55 26.85 47.81 -0.13 0.09 
Nigeria  7.35 -22.83 4.80 -0.28 -5.12 -2.60 -5.25 -2.65 -9.94 -7.59 11.09 6.66 39.38 59.27 -0.98 -0.12 
a The percentage changes are measured relative to Swiss-25 tariff cuts with no SSM (scenario 2). 
b  The figures under government revenue for the US and the EU show changes in the cost of their government programs. 
C= 5.8 million 
D = 26.1 million   28
 
Table 6 continued.  
   Wheat Variables - Percent Change 
  Price   (%)  Production (%)  Total Use (%)  Net Trade (%) 
Consumer        
Surplus (%) 
Producer       
Surplus (%) 
Gov't              
Revenue (%) 
Net             
Welfare (%) 
COUNTRY  Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev 
Peru  0.90  -2.35 0.68 -1.99 -0.30 -7.61 -0.42 -9.28 -0.66 -8.13 1.43 -1.53 10.88  237.39 0.10  0.20 
Philippinnes 0.47  -11.29  ----  ----    -0.47 -12.52 -0.46 -12.52 -0.36  -4.62  ----  ----    7.66 347.34 0.13  -0.21 
South  Korea  -0.04 -2.84  ----  ----    0.05 -2.86 0.05 -2.86 0.03 -2.31 -0.04 -2.84 4.63  551.25  0.22 0.56 
Tunisia  1.84  3.21  1.14 -2.86 -0.43 -2.75 -2.01 -5.90 -0.88 -3.11 2.50 -2.71 20.22 69.45 -0.01 -0.09 
United  A.E.  0.24  1.27  ----  ----    -0.13 -1.13 -0.13 -1.13 -0.35 -1.38 0.24  1.27 14.73 82.06 0.18  0.10 
Venezuela  0.04 -1.20 0.02 -0.26  -0.02 -3.60 -0.02 -3.60 -0.05 -3.93 0.05 -0.48 2.66  140.35  0.14 0.11 
AFD 2.41  -5.66  2.67  -2.40  -1.52 -10.34 -2.44 -13.06 -3.10 -11.32 5.04  -0.02 19.67 143.13 -0.14  -0.78 
CTA  0.00 -0.28  ----  ----    0.00 -1.96 0.00 -1.96 -0.02 -2.18 0.00 -0.28 5.39  154.51  0.19 0.29 
STA  0.35 -6.39 0.34 -5.56  -0.17 -5.68 -0.87 -8.67 -0.35 -5.97 0.58 -5.09 8.34 76.80 0.04 0.08 
ASG  0.26 -4.89 0.23 -2.76  -0.19 -6.40 -0.46 -8.51 -0.40 -6.19 0.38 -2.78 7.13  114.35  0.09 0.07 
MEG  -0.19 1.54  ----  ----    0.08 0.19  0.08 0.19 0.15 0.27 -0.19 1.54 -0.11 0.32 0.15 0.27 
ROW  -0.19 1.46 -0.15 0.30 0.15 0.11  0.97 0.26 0.30 0.22 -0.30 0.27 0.76 -0.06 0.05 0.11 
Least Developed                  
Bangladesh  -0.39 0.78 -0.13 -0.42 0.22 -0.83 0.67 -1.15 0.41 -0.78 -0.47 -1.15 -3.21  21.94 0.06 0.10 
Ethiopia  1.44  3.58  0.57 -1.05 -0.72 -2.01 -4.98 -3.24 -1.47 -2.57 1.77 -0.85 40.56 53.51 -0.01 0.00 
Yemen  -0.19 1.20 -0.05 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.16 0.13 -0.21  -0.05 ----  ----   0.14 0.12 
SAG  -0.05 -2.24 -0.04 -0.92 0.03 -2.74 0.04 -2.96 0.05 -3.01 -0.09 -1.12 3.10  147.13  0.18 0.32 
NAG 0.13  -2.65  0.11  -0.46  -0.12  -4.09 -0.12 -4.14 -0.31 -4.69 0.21 -0.39 6.89 135.10 0.28  0.14 
WORLD  -0.19  1.53 -0.02 -0.25 -0.02 -0.25  0.00  0.00  ----  ----   ----  ----   ----  ----   -0.12 -4.68 
                             
  
Welfare Difference From Scenario 2 ($US) = $ -133 Million 
 